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This paper analyzes the competition between two spatially differentiated multi-product 
retailers who encounter entry from a dominant discount retailer. Our primary objective is 
to determine how entry affects the pricing and relative profits of the incumbent stores and 
the role played by the location of the entrant. The new entrant has partial overlap in 
product assortment with the incumbents and is assumed to have lower procurement costs 
for the common goods. Consumers are heterogeneous in their location, economic status 
(shopping costs and valuations), as well as purchase basket or the types of products 
demanded. Results show that in the post entry equilibrium, the prices for the products not 
offered by the discounter are higher than the pre entry prices. More interestingly, contrary 
to the conventional wisdom we find that the store that is closer to the new entrant is better 
off compared to the incumbent located further away. The intuition for these results is that 
the discounter with its low price draws away the poor consumers – the price sensitive 
segment – out of the market for the items it carries. This in turn softens price competition 
between the incumbents for these items. Furthermore, the new entrant’s unique product 
offering attracts more consumers to visit the location it occupies, which introduces 
positive demand externalities to the neighboring retailer, leading to an increase in sales 
for the non-competing products. We provide empirical evidence for our results and 
discuss implications for retailers facing competition from large discount stores.  
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1. Introduction  
The past decade or so has seen a tremendous growth in the mega retailers such as Wal-
Mart, Home Depot, Staples, Costco, IKEA, and others, which has fundamentally changed 
the buying and spending patterns of consumers. The dramatic growth and success of 
these stores have garnered debates over the economic and social consequences of “big 
box” retailers. Commentators have argued about the pros and cons of the entry by these 
stores into the local markets. On the positive side, arguments have been presented on 
issues related to lower consumer prices, broader product availability, job creation, and 
increased tax revenues for the local economy. Critics have pointed out the negative 
aspects related to lower wages and job losses in the long run, unfair competition, and 
increased traffic and congestion resulting in negative impact upon the ”sociology” of the 
community.   
Another issue that has received a lot of attention in the business press is the 
impact of these “big box” stores on the locally owned/operated small retailers. While a 
number of anecdotal reports have documented the negative effects of entry by such mega 
stores on the small retail establishments (Stone 1995, Shils and Taylor 1997), there is 
limited academic work on the issue. Past research has primarily focused on competition 
between symmetric retailers (e.g. Lal and Matutes 1989), or retail stores that differ only 
in pricing formats, for example, EDLP vs. Hi-Lo pricing (Bell and Lattin 1998, Lal and 
Rao 1997, Messinger and Narasimhan 1997). With minor exceptions (Fox et al. 2004, 
Singh et al., 2004, Dukes et al., 2005, Raju and Zhang 2005), limited attention has been 
given to the growth of alternative retail formats such as mass discounters.
4  
In this paper we investigate the impact of entry by a national discount store on 
local retail competition. We develop a spatial model of competition between two multi-
product stores that encounter entry by a discount store into the market. Pre-competitor 
entry, our modeling approach parallels that used previously in the literature (e.g. Lal and 
Matutes 1994). The incumbent retailers are located at the end points of a Hotelling line 
and are assumed to carry two products. Consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their 
                                                 
4 Fox et al. (2004) study store choice across retail formats, while Singh et al. (2004) provide an empirical 
study on the impact of entry by a Wal-Mart supercenter on a supermarket chain. Dukes et al. (2005) and 
Raju and Zhang (2005) study channel bargaining and coordination issues in the presence of dominant 
retailers such as those mentioned above.   2
location along the line as well as their economic status. In particular, we consider two 
types of consumers – rich and poor – that differ in terms of their transportation and 
shopping cost as well as their reservation value for the products.
5 Equilibrium prices and 
profits from this benchmark game are derived following the analysis presented in Lal and 
Matutes (1989). 
We next consider entry by a discount store that locates at one of the end points, 
i.e. in the immediate location of one of the incumbents. The model incorporates many 
aspects of the retailing world such as differentiation in the product assortments and cost 
advantages for the discounter. In particular, we assume that the new entrant carries one of 
the products offered by the incumbent stores and also offers a unique product. Thus there 
is a partial overlap in the product offering of the incumbents and the new entrant. For 
instance, we can think of the incumbents as two grocery stores offering fresh produce and 
general merchandise, and the entrant as a Wal-Mart discount store offering general 
merchandise and durable electronics. Wal-Mart is assumed to have cost advantages in 
that it can procure the general merchandise items at a lower cost than the supermarkets.
6 
Following competitor entry, we consider another dimension of consumer heterogeneity 
based on the difference of the purchase basket or the types of products consumers need. 
Since some products (such as durables) are bought less frequently than others, we assume 
some of the consumers need all three products, while other consumers only buy a subset 
of the available products.  
Using the structure described above, our primary objective in this paper is to 
determine how entry by this differentiated competitor affects the pricing and profits of 
the incumbent stores. In particular, we analyze the multi-product pricing strategies 
employed by the incumbents and the role played by the location of the entering 
discounter. In general, one would expect the prices for the products to fall due to 
increased competition in the market and the impact of entry on profits to be higher for the 
store closer to the new competitor. However, once we incorporate differentiation of 
                                                 
5 Similar heterogeneity in travel and search costs has been used previously in Narasimhan (1988), Raju et 
al. (1988), Lal and Rao (1997) among others.  
6 There are many other reasons such as non-unionized labor force, efficient supply chain, etc. why these 
stores (particularly Wal-Mart) have been able to keep their costs down vis-à-vis the smaller supermarket 
chains. See for example discussion in Singh et al. (2004). 
   3
product offerings by the entrant and consumer heterogeneity, we may get different 
results. In particular, our analysis shows that in the post-entry equilibrium, the prices for 
the products not offered by the discounter are higher than the pre entry prices. More 
interestingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom we find that the store that is closer to 
the new entrant is better off compared to the incumbent located further away.  
The intuition for these results is as follows: In the before entry equilibrium, the 
two incumbent retailers earn equal profits and segment the market symmetrically, serving 
both poor and rich consumers. After entry by the discounter, however, its low price draws 
the poor consumers – the price sensitive segment – out of the market for the items it 
carries. This in turn fosters market segmentation and softens price competition between 
the incumbents for these items. Furthermore, the new entrant’s unique product offering 
attracts more rich consumers to visit the location it occupies, which introduces positive 
demand externalities to the neighboring retailer. This encourages the nearby incumbent to 
abandon the poor segment altogether and focus exclusively on the price-insensitive 
segment. The distant retailer, on the other hand, is unable to attract this segment because 
of their high shopping and transportation costs. Hence, this incumbent focuses on the less 
lucrative, poor consumer segment. 
We provide empirical evidence for our key finding. We use store level data from 
two supermarkets in a suburban Chicago market. This market saw entry by a discount 
store, which opened up in same shopping plaza as one of the supermarkets. For the 
second store the entrant located about 2 miles away and next to a competitor grocery 
store. Two years of sales (aggregate store level as well as for individual departments) are 
observed both pre and post discount store entry. We use a semi-log specification and 
regress store sales as function of an indicator variable representing competitor entry and 
other control variables. As predicted by the theory, we find the sales for dry grocery and 
general merchandise items to fall at both the incumbent supermarkets. However, the sales 
for several food products (such as meat, produce, and deli that are not offered by the 
discount store) are observed to rise after Wal-Mart’s entry at the store located next to the 
entrant. On the other hand, sales of both general merchandise as well as the food items go 
down when the entrant is located far away and next to a competitor grocery store. The 
aggregate store sales and store traffic went down by 16% and 10% respectively for this   4
store. In comparison, for the supermarket located in the same shopping plaza as the 
entrant the store sales went down by only 4%, and the store traffic showed a marginal 
increase post-competitor entry.  
An important ingredient for our results is the demand externality generated by the 
entering discounter’s alternative product. The result is similar to the findings in economic 
literature on agglomeration when consumers have search costs (Stahl 1982a, 1982b, 
Gabszewicz and Garella 1987) that justifies, for example, the casual observation that car 
dealers are often located near each other. In the current context, the tradeoff between the 
positive demand externality versus the losses due to competitor entry depends on the 
degree of overlap across the stores. For instance, if the entrant is a store like Home Depot 
or Barnes & Noble with little overlap with the incumbent grocery store, the positive 
externality could significantly outweigh any negative effects. On the other hand, if the 
entrant is a store like a supercenter (a discount store combined with a full supermarket), 
the store closer to the competitor is likely to be worse off. With this format, our results 
suggest that incumbent grocery stores should differentiate themselves by providing 
unique offerings such as ethnic and organic foods, and an emphasis on home meal 
replacements, deli, and so forth that are not found at supercenters. More generally our 
results have implications for retailers wishing to understand the changing distribution of 
their customers when a “feared” national discounter enters the market.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe our model and results 
in next section. Section 3 provides empirical evidence for some of the main findings, and 
we conclude in section 4 with a discussion of limitations of the current paper and 
directions for future research. 
2. The Theory 
Two stores A and B are located at the end points of a line, and consumers are uniformly 
distributed between the stores on this line. Both A and B carry two products, which we 
call 1 and 2.
7 Both stores face a constant marginal cost  0 > K  of selling each product. 
This cost incorporates wholesale and marginal retailing costs. 
                                                 
7 To help readers follow the model, we summarize the notation in Table 1.   5
 Store  C is a mass discounter, for example a Wal-Mart. It plans to enter the market 
by locating at the same location as an existing store.
8 Without loss of generality, we 
assume that the discounter is located alongside retailer A (see Figure 1). Store C carries 
product 2 and a third product, called product 3, which is not carried by the other retailers. 
Hence there is partial overlap of categories carried by the traditional retailers A, B and the 
new entrant C. Product 2 is the common product offered by all retailers, and the 
traditional retailers and discounter distinguish themselves by carrying product 1 and 3 
respectively. It might be helpful to think of goods 1, 2, and 3 corresponding to produce, 
dry grocery goods, and some small appliance, respectively. Alternatively, we can think of 
product 1 as an offering more specific to local tastes and preferences. 
  Each consumer buys at most one unit of products 1, 2, and 3. We denote by  i v  the 
reservation value for each product  3 , 2 , 1 = i . Consumers are segmented in two 
dimensions: income and interest in product 3. Assume that α  is the portion of high 
income consumers who have valuation  H vi =  for products  2 , 1 = i . The remaining 
portion is the set of low income consumers who have valuation  H L vi < =  for products 
2 , 1 = i . For product 3, a portion β  of consumers, whom we call Big Basket consumers, 
have positive valuation  0 3 > v  while the remainder  β − 1 , referred to as Small Basket 
consumers, do not value product 3. Thus all consumers demand products 1 & 2, but only 
a fraction of consumers (large basket) demand product 3. The primary motivation for this 
assumption is to represent the difference of purchase frequency among categories – 
consumers buy foods and groceries once or twice a week, but buy durables less 
frequently. 
Consumers also differ in terms of their shopping and transportation costs. 
Specifically, high income consumers incur transportation costs when visiting one of the 
stores. That is, a high income consumer located distance x from a store incurs a cost 
0 > t  per unit traveled. In addition these consumers incur a fixed shopping cost  0 > s  for 
each store visited, where s is the opportunity cost of the consumer’s time spent in the 
                                                 
8 It may be possible to consider entry by the discounter at some other location. For example, the discounter 
could locate in the middle of the line, equally distant between the two retailers. However, our intention is to 
capture asymmetric effects on competition between A and B post entry and thus do not consider this case. 
For discounter locations off the endpoints, but favoring one of the retailers, we expect our analysis to lead 
to similar qualitative results.   6
store and may include the cost of finding the product, time spent in the line, etc. Low 
income consumers, on the other hand, have no transportation or shopping costs.
9 In this 
sense, low income consumers behave as “cherry pickers” because their shopping and 
transportation costs are zero. The segmentation of consumers is summarized in Table 2. 
In our later analysis, we explain how the existence of high and low income consumers 
influences firms’ pricing strategies. 
 
  Table 1: List of Notations in the Model 
Products  1  Produce – only available at incumbents (A, B). 
  2  Groceries – available at all stores (A, B & C). 
  3  Durables – only available at the entrant (C). 
Stores  A,B  Two incumbents. Carry products 1 (produce) and  
2 (grocery). 
    A is closer to the discounter. 
  C  The entrant. C carries product 2 (grocery) and 3 (durables). 
  0 > K   Marginal cost of store A and B 
Consumers  0 > L   Reservation value on products 1 & 2 for  
Low income consumers  
  L H >   Reservation value on products 1 & 2 for  
High income consumers  
  Big Basket  Consumers who demand products 1, 2 and 3 
  Small Basket  Consumers who demand products 1 and 2 only 
  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ α   The ratio of high income consumers 
  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ β   The ratio of Big Basket consumers 
  0 > t   Transportation cost of High income consumers. 
  0 > s   Shopping cost of High income consumers 
 
 
Given this characterization of the market, we can now define the game of interest. 
We consider two games played by retailers A and B. In one game, the retailers compete in 
product prices in absence of the discounter C. In the second game, retailers compete after 
retailer C has entered and is located next to A. Note that the focus of our analysis is on the 
pricing strategies of the two traditional retailers and, as such, we do not model the 
discounter as a strategic actor.
10 
                                                 
9 We have labeled these consumer groups to reflect the common notion that high wage earners face higher 
shopping costs due to the higher opportunity costs of time. While this notion has empirical support for 
those above the poverty level (Frankel and Gould, 2001), we do not model income as a determinant of 
shopping behavior. 
10 This may be interpreted by the fact that national discount chains often have a centralized, rather than a 
local, objective, which reflects, among other things, the chain’s image. (See Montgomery 1997.)   7
  In both games, retailers A and B simultaneously set prices for products 1 and 2. 
Subsequently, each consumer learns these prices and then formulates a shopping plan, 
which specifies the stores from which they buy each product. Finally, consumers carry 
out their shopping plan.  
In what follows, we derive the equilibrium in the game before discounter entry, as 
a benchmark, and compare it to the equilibrium of the game after entry. We restrict 
attention to equilibria in pure strategies.
11 
2.1 Before Entry 
In this section we present the benchmark case in which the traditional retailers compete 
amongst themselves in absence of the discounter. A more complete analysis has been 
examined elsewhere and in more generality. (See Lal & Matutes 1989.) Our intention 
here, therefore, is to establish a set of conditions for properly comparing the equilibria 
before and after entry by the discounter. 
Before entry, each retailer has some incentive to attract low income consumers by 
undercutting its rival by a small amount because these consumers buy product j from the 
store with the lowest price. Obviously, however, acting on this incentive erodes the 
ability to extract surplus from the high income consumers. Consequently, any possible 
equilibrium in which retailers are able to avoid ruinous price undercutting will involve 
some sort of segmentation – either by products or by income level. Segmentation on 
income level cannot be sustained as an equilibrium, however, if the surplus from poor 
consumers is low, relative to that from rich consumers. Suppose one retailer, say A, caters 
to poor consumers by setting prices uniformly low. Retailer B could profitably steal a 
portion of these consumers from A without losing any of its current rich consumers. The 
profitability of this strategy stems from the fact that rich consumers formulate their 
shopping plan based solely on the price of the total basket – product 1 plus product 2. 
Knowing this, retailer B can capture all poor consumers by lowering the price of one of 
its products to a level just below the price at its rival. Then, by raising the price of its 
                                                 
11 Equilibria in non-trivial mixed strategies would involve distributions of order statistics since poor 
consumers are choosing the minimum of two probabilistically offered prices. Such an investigation may 
lead to rich interpretations of sales and promotions (Varian 1980, Narasimhan 1988), but is not our present 
focus.   8
other product by an offsetting amount – keeping the sum of its prices constant – it looses 
nothing from its rich customers.
12 
Rather than segment on consumer income levels, both retailers might alternatively 
segment the market by coordinating prices so that poor consumers are attracted to buy 
one product from each store, say product 1 at store A and product 2 at store B. Then, 
through higher prices on the other product, retailers capture surplus from a portion of the 
rich consumer segment, which is loyal to only one store. Such coordination by retailers, 
termed reversed pricing (Lal & Matutes 1989), is possible only if the surplus from the 
poor segment is sufficiently low, relative to the rich segment. We, therefore, impose the 
following limit on the potential surplus from low income consumers: 
Assumption 1:  2 / t K L < − . 
Without this assumption, equilibria may not exist. Note that Assumption 1 not only 
provides an upper bound on surplus from low income consumers, but it also relates the 
extent to which retailers can extract surplus from high income consumers, as reflected by 
the lower bound on transportation costs parameter t. Given this assumption, we have two 
lemmas that state what cannot occur in equilibrium. (All proofs can be found in the 
Appendix.) 
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, no equilibria exists in which one retailer serves all 
poor consumers with both products. 
As a consequence of this lemma, if an equilibrium exists, it must involve one retailer not 
selling at least one product to poor consumers. The next lemma rules out equilibria in 
which any retailer completely excludes poor consumers. 
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, no equilibrium exists in which a retailer does not 
serve poor consumers at least one product. 
In addition, it is necessary to impose a lower bound on the reservation value of high 
income consumers so that they remain active in the market. Specifically,  
  Assumption 2:  s H L t K − < − + 2 . 
Under this model formulation along with the above assumptions we now establish the 
before (discounter) entry equilibrium. Denote by  ij p  the price of product i at store j 
                                                 
12 A formalization of this argument establishes the results of Lemmas 1 and 2.   9
before entry by the discounter, and  ij p ˆ  for the corresponding equilibrium price. The 
following proposition characterizes the prices in an equilibrium with retailers earning 
positive profits in absence of the discounter. 
 Proposition 1  Under Assumptions 1 & 2, there is a threshold,  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ BE α , which 
depends on K, L, and t, such that for all ) 1 , ( BE α α ∈ , there exist equilibria 
characterized as follows: 
(i) L p p j i = = 2 1 ˆ ˆ ;  j i ≠ , 
(ii) L L t K p p i j > − + = = 2 ˆ ˆ 2 1 , 
(iii)  Each retailer sells to exactly ½ of high income segment. All poor consumers 
visit retailer i for product 1 and retailer j for product 2. 
(iv)  Each retailer earns profits:  2 ) )( 1 ( ˆ t
j K L α α π + − − = . 
This proposition establishes conditions guaranteeing two reversed pricing equilibria in 
which retailers alleviate competition by coordinating prices. In both equilibria, one 
retailer sets a low price on one product and a high price on the other product, while the 
other retailer mirrors this strategy.
13 These pricing strategies force low income consumers 
to shop in both stores and allow retailers to extract their entire surplus L. Furthermore, 
retailers enjoy duopoly (Hotelling) margins on the high income consumers.
14  
The threshold  BE α  specified in Proposition 1 defines the minimum portion of 
high income consumers required to keep retailers from deviating to a low price strategy 
in an attempt to grab all low income consumers. A similar threshold  AE α  is specified for 
the equilibrium after entry by the discounter. Hence, all comparisons of the equilibria 
before and after entry are valid as long the portion of low income consumers α  exceeds 
the larger of  BE α  and  AE α . 
Before considering the model with the discounter, it is worthwhile to note at this 
point that both retailers’ market shares among rich consumers are equal at ½ in the 
equilibria of Proposition 1. This is a result of the fact that rich consumers make their 
                                                 
13 Note that the choice between the two equilibria of Proposition 1 is arbitrary for the comparison in §2.2. 
All other relevant properties of the equilibria are the same and, most importantly, do not depend on a 
retailer’s location. 
14 It can be shown that these consumers shop at only one (1) store in equilibrium. See Lal & Matutes (1989) 
for a formal proof.   10
decision of which retailer to visit based solely on the price of a bundle – the sum of 
k k p p 2 1 + ,  B A k , =  – which is the same at each retailer. At the same time, each retailer 
sells one category to the entire poor segment. Therefore retailer A and B share the similar 
consumer profiles. We return to this observation in section 2.3 where we use the theory to 
predict changes in consumers’ shopping patterns as a result of entry by the discounter. 
2.2 After Entry  
In this section, we derive an equilibrium outcome after entry by the discounter. Our 
intention is to compare the outcome in this equilibrium with that of the previous section. 
Specifically, we make predictions regarding the movement of prices for products 1 and 2 
at each retailer as a result of the discounter’s entry. Also of interest is the consequent 
change in consumers’ retailer choice. It is important to keep in mind, however, that for 
meaningful theoretical predictions, we must ensure consistency across the two scenarios. 
That is, any parameter restrictions, on α  and β  for example, imposed in this after-entry 
model, must still permit the restrictions imposed in the before-entry model. To this end, 
we maintain assumptions made in Section 2.1 and impose additional parameter 
restrictions here, as necessary. 
  We model entry by the discounter as follows. Retailer C locates next to retailer A 
on the line, as described previously. (See Figure 1.) Recall that this retailer carries 
product 2 as well as a second product, product 3, which is not offered by either A or B. In 
order to capture the discounter’s influence, we assume that C offers product 2 at a price 
just at or below the other retailers’ marginal cost. Furthermore, the surplus consumers get 
from product 3 is sufficiently high that all Big Basket consumers find it worthwhile to 
buy it. 
  Since there are three sellers in the market, and each consumer is going to buy 
multiple products, there is a large number of store choice combinations to be considered 
in order to write down each seller’s demand function given prices. In the search for an 
equilibrium in the post entry model, it is convenient to rule out certain outcomes that are 
not sustainable in an equilibrium. It is already possible to eliminate a large set of 
consumers’ shopping plans from consideration. Specifically, the following lemma 
characterizes this restricted set of possible equilibrium shopping plans.   11
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium of the after-entry model, we have the following: 
(i)  No Big Basket rich consumer will shop at more than two (2) stores. 
(ii)  No Small Basket rich consumer will shop at more than one (1) store. 
The first part of Lemma 3 follows directly from our assumption that the discounter, 
retailer C, offers the lowest price for product 2: any consumer interested in product 3 
necessarily visits C and, while there, buys product 2. Hence, this consumer need only 
visit one more store.  
To understand part (ii), note that if a Small Basket consumer located at x &  
shopped around by buying product 1 at A and product 2 at C, then all Small Basket 
consumers located at  x x & <  would do the same, leaving A with no demand for product 2. 
Such a case cannot be part of an equilibrium since A would profitably deviate by 
lowering its price on product 2 just below  s p C + 2 . Therefore, any shopping plan of 
Small Basket consumers involving two stores would require travel across the entire 
distance of the line plus additional shopping time, which induces costs (transportation 
plus shopping) greater than any savings in price. (See the proof in the Appendix for a 
precise argument on why that is not possible.) 
Given the above result, it is now possible to rule out certain pricing behavior in 
equilibrium, which allows us to concentrate on a smaller set of consumer purchase 
patterns. First, note that all low income consumers buy product 2 at the discounter. 
Therefore, as a consequence of the discounter’s entry, retailers A and B can no longer 
sustain  reversed pricing, as presented in Proposition 1, in equilibrium. Recall that 
reversed pricing was sustainable because poor consumers had to visit one of the 
traditional retailers to get product 2. That left exclusive sale of product 1, among poor 
consumers, to the other retailer. Post entry, however, the discounter corners the entire set 
of poor consumers in the sale of product 2.  
The next observation concerns the post entry prices for product 1. Since all 
consumers, in particular Big Basket consumers, are assumed to travel to the discounter, 
there is a large portion of rich consumers in the neighborhood of retailer A who need 
product 1. Furthermore, these consumers have relatively low price elasticity for product 1 
since they incur additional transportation costs by shopping at retailer B. Retailer B, on 
the other hand, has only its original local Small Basket customers. Intuitively, therefore,   12
retailer A has an incentive to raise its price on product 1 in order to capture high surpluses 
coming from Big Basket consumers. The existence of such an incentive implies that 
retailer A will never have the lower price for product 1. This is formally stated in the 
following lemma. 
Lemma 4 No equilibrium exists in which  B A p p 1 1 ≤ . 
Based on this lemma, we can conclude that the only possible equilibrium has retailer A 
setting the highest price for product 1. Hence, we shall suppose that this is the case and 




1 B A p p > . One such 
condition is that rich consumers’ shopping cost s (the cost of entering an additional store) 
is sufficiently large so as to ensure retailer A positive demand for its common product 
with the discounter.  
Assumption 3:  ( )t s αβ
α − − >
1
3
1 1.  
Without this assumption, no consumer entering retailer A would buy product 2 for any 
price above marginal cost leaving it no incentive to carry the common product.  
In order to derive candidate equilibrium prices, we now compute retailers’ profit 
functions. This requires a characterization of consumer shopping patterns given 
B A p p 1 1 > . This price ordering implies that retailer B sells product 1 to all poor 
consumers. Because no single product is cheapest at A, it sells to rich consumers only. 
(Recall that all poor consumers visit the discounter, retailer C, for product 2.) For a rich 
Big Basket consumer, she will buy goods 2 and 3 at C. The decision of getting product 1 
at A or B is based on her location as well as the prices of product 1. A rich Big Basket 
consumer will buy product 1 from A if  B p1  is not sufficiently lower than  A p1  to 
compensate her for additional travel cost she must incur. Formally, a rich Big Basket 
consumer located at x will buy product 1 from A if 
  t x p p A B ) 1 ( 1 1 − − > . 
Rich Small Basket consumers, who have no interest in product 3, have the same decision 
criterion as before entry by the discounter. Namely, these consumers form their shopping 
plan based purely on the price of the bundle. A consumer located at x buys products 1 and 
2 from retailer A if and only if 
  t x p p xt p p B B A A ) 1 ( 2 1 2 1 − + + < + + .   13
Hence, under the assumption that  A B p p 1 1 < , the two traditional retailers’ profits can be 
written as 
  2 2 1 1 1 ) 2 )( 1 ( ) ( x K p p x K p A A A A − + − + − = β α αβ π       (1) 
  ) 1 )( 2 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( ( ) )( 1 ( 2 2 1 1 1 1 x K p p x K p K p B B B B B − − + − + − − + − − = β α αβ α π , (2) 
where  i x  represents the location of the consumer of type  = i (B)ig, (S)mall Basket who is 









1 1 ,   and   
t
t p p p p
x
A A B B
S 2
) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 + + − +
= . (3) 









1 B A p p >  is necessary in equilibrium, it does not allow us to conclude that these 
prices actually constitute an equilibrium. Suppose, for example, there are many poor 
consumers relative to rich Big Basket consumers. If  B A p p 1 1 > , then retailer 1 will prefer 
to abandon the high end of the market and go after the poor segment by undercutting 
retailer 2’s price on product 1. Alternatively, if  B A p p 1 1 < , retailer B will have a similar 
incentive to undercut its rival on product 1. Because the poor segment is a relatively 
lucrative segment with respect to product 1, both retailers always have an incentive to 
undercut each other down to marginal cost. But joint marginal cost pricing can also not 
be an equilibrium since either retailer would unilaterally raise its product 1 price and gain 
a positive profit from the rich consumers. Summarizing, when the portion of rich Big 
Basket consumers is too small, we have an Edgeworth cycle in the price for product 1 
among the two retailers and, therefore, no equilibrium. This problem goes away, 
fortunately, when the rich Big Basket segment of consumers is relatively large.  
The size of the rich Big Basket segment depends on the two parameters α  and β . 
In particular, sufficiently large values of either parameter ensure that an equilibrium 
exists in the after-entry game. To make this condition precise, we define  ) (β α AE  to be 
the lower bound on the portion of rich consumers α  for a given portion β  of Big Basket 
consumers. The function  ) (β α AE , which is specified in Proposition 2, is decreasing in 
β , which means that as the portion of Big Basket consumers decreases, a larger segment 
of rich consumers is required to prevent retailer A from deviating from its high product   14
pricing strategy. Intuitively, as β  decreases, retailer A has lower ability to leverage the 
traffic brought by retailer C and a higher portion of rich consumers will compensate for 
the lower positive externality from store traffic. 
Proposition 2: Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold and let  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ β . 
(i) There exists a threshold 
) 5 5 ( 2
5 3 5 10
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(iii) In equilibrium, each retailer earns profits expressed by 
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While Proposition 2 establishes the existence of an equilibrium in the after-entry game, it 
also summarizes the equilibrium outcome, which can be used in comparison with the 
equilibrium in the previous section to generate qualitative predictions about the direction 
of prices, profits, and market shares resulting from entry by the discounter.
15 We then use 
these theoretical predictions to derive hypotheses about post entry outcomes at retailers 
located near a Wal-Mart (retailer A) and those retailers located some distance to a Wal-
Mart (retailer B). 
                                                 
15 The comparison of equilibrium outcome before and after the discounter’s entry is summarized in table 3.   15
Figure 2 shows how the sales of product 1 and 2 are divided among store A, B and 
C. Store A has a larger market share of product 1 even though product 2’s price at store A 
is higher than that at store B. The larger sales of product 1 at store A is brought by the 
larger traffic of store C. Both store A and B’s sales of product 2 shrink dramatically after 
discounter C’s entry. Each of the traditional retailers sell product 2 only to those Small 
Basket high income consumers. After the discounter’s entry, it is possible for retailer A 
and  B to segment the consumers based on income level. The customer profiles are 
different in the two traditional stores. Retailer A has the ability to extract more surplus 
from consumers, since only high income consumers shop at store A. This leads to the 
central result, which is implied by the above analysis. 
Proposition 3 Under the conditions of Proposition 2, retailer A has higher profits 
than retailer B. 
This final result summarizes the paper’s main message. From the perspective of a 
traditional retailer, if a large scale national discounter is entering the market, then it might 
be better off having it close by rather than next to a distant competitor. Crucial for this 
result is that the retailer carries some specialized products, (e.g. product 1 in our model), 
that the discounter does not carry. The discounter’s low prices generate higher demand 
for the nearby retailer’s unique offerings, enabling it to extract higher surpluses from 
those consumers with large shopping costs. In context of competitor entry under demand 
externalities, Xie and Sirbu (1995) find that incumbents’ profits increase from compatible 
entry. Note, however, that according to our results, despite the benefits accruing to the 
nearby retailer, entry by the discounter does not improve the profits of this incumbent 
relative to pre entry. Three retailers, instead of two, share potential surpluses post entry. 
Instead, our results suggest that if entry by a large discounter is inevitable, then an 
incumbent store should prefer it locates next door instead of near the rival incumbent. 
To understand the workings of the after-entry model, it is instructive to consider 
some comparative statics of prices with respect to α  and β . With regard to the relative 
size of the rich consumers, first note that an increase in α  has no direct effect on retailer 
A’s pricing strategies since it serves only this segment in equilibrium.
16 On the other 
hand, retailer B serves some rich and all poor consumers and, consequently, changes in 
                                                 
16 The profit function in (1) is proportional to α .   16
α  alter its pricing incentives. Through a strategic effect, this affects retailer A’s prices in 
equilibrium. Specifically, an increase in α  lowers retailer B’s interest in its monopoly on 
the poor consumers for product 1, thereby encouraging it to lower  B p1  in order to attract 
the rich consumers. And since retailer B serves product 2 only to rich consumers, an 
increase in α  raises store demand for this product, making it optimal to raise  B p2 , 
accordingly. Retailer A experiences positive strategic effects from retailer B’s price 
changes. Hence, as can be seen in the expressions of Proposition 2 (i), an increase in α  
lowers the equilibrium prices for product 1 and raises them for product 2.   
Alternatively, the parameter β  can be interpreted as a measure of differentiation 
between the discounter and two traditional retailers. For example, as the portion β  of 
consumers who value 3 grows, the two retailers are forced to compete more aggressively 
for their unique product, product 1. As shown in the equilibrium price expressions of 
Proposition 2, 
*
1A p  and 
*
1B p  are decreasing in β . Note, however, that because all poor 
consumers buy product 2 at the discounter, the traditional retailers compete for product 2 
only among the rich Small Basket consumers, who make decisions based solely on the 
price of the bundle  i i p p 2 1 + ,  B A i , = . Moreover, changes in β  do not affect 
competition over this segment of consumers and, consequently, neither retailer has an 
incentive to change the price of the bundle. Therefore, an increase in β  leads to increases 
in 
*
2i p  that correspond to the decreases in 
*
1i p  as discussed above. Table 4 summarizes 
the comparative statics results. It is also interesting to observe that retailer B’s price is 
more sensitive to the change of α  and β . 
3. Empirical Evidence 
The model described above generates a number of relevant predictions about the behavior 
of the market before and after the discounter’s entry. Specifically, we examine the change 
in sales for the two products at the incumbents. These predictions are stated below as 
hypotheses, which are tested against our data. 
The first set of predictions relate to the changes in the sales for the two products at 
retailer A. As discussed above, retailer A enjoys a larger share of rich consumers after-
entry because the rich Big Basket consumers who come to the discounter for the outside   17
product, product 3, save shopping costs by buying product 1 at the nearby retailer. 
Intuitively, therefore, we expect retailer A to see an increase in sales for product 1 after 
entry by the discounter. One can see this formally by examining the non-price terms of 
(1). In the after-entry equilibrium, the amount of sales of product 1 retailer A makes is: 
3
1
6 2 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
Retailer  at    1 product 
of   Sales Entry  After 
+ + = − + = β β α αβ
α x x
A
,      
which is greater than ½ under the conditions of Proposition 2. 
  The theory above also allows us to predict retailer A’s change in sales for product 
2 after entry. The fierce competition for product 2 with the discounter removes any 
possibility of getting poor consumers to buy this product at retailer A. Furthermore, Big 
Basket consumers buy product 2 at the cheaper store. This intuition is supported by the 
theory. Using (1) again shows that 
2
1
2 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
Retailer  at    2 product 
of   Sales Entry  After 
β α β α − = − = x
A
,       
which is obviously less than ½.  
A similar analysis leads us to generate predictions about the sales at the distant 
retailer, retailer B in our model. Since retailer A gains in its sale of product 1 and the 
discounter dominates in the sale of product 2, we intuitively expect that the distant 
retailer B suffers sales losses on both products. Using the non-price terms in the profit 
equation (2), we can formally verify this: 
), 1 (
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, 
which are both less than ½ under the conditions of Proposition 2.
17 This leads us to the 
following set of hypotheses regarding the change in sales of the two products carried by 
the traditional retailers: 
•  H1a: For the traditional retailers near the discounter, the sales of its unique 
products are higher after the discounter’s entry. 
                                                 
17 Note that  1 ) 1 ( > + β α  is implied by  ) (β α α AE > .   18
•  H1b: For the traditional retailers near the discounter, the sales of its products 
common with the discounter decrease after entry. 
•  H2a: For the traditional retailers far away from the discounter, the sales of its 
unique products are lower after the discounter’s entry. 
•  H2b: For the traditional retailers far away from the discounter, the sales of its 
products common with the discounter decrease after entry. 
To test these hypotheses we use Dominick’s Finer Food (DFF), which is a large 
supermarket chain in the Chicago metropolitan area.
18 For this study, we use data from 
two specific stores located in the suburbs of Chicago. One of these stores (Store # 28 in 
the database) is located in a shopping plaza in Mt. Prospect, and the second store (# 119) 
is located in Buffalo Grove. Both stores saw entry by a discount store (Wal-Mart) at 
approximately the same time (November 1991 for store #28 and January 1992 for store 
#119), but with one critical difference – the location of the new entrant. For store #28 in 
Mt. Prospect, the new entrant is located in the same shopping plaza right next door to the 
incumbent, while the entrant it is located 2.2 miles from store #119 and next to a 
competitor grocery store. Thus, these stores correspond to stores A (#28) and B (#119) in 
our theoretical model.  
For both stores we observe more than two years of daily sales data both pre and 
post competitor entry.
19 In particular, our database includes total store level sales, total 
number of transactions at the store (store traffic), as well as sales at individual 
departments such as general merchandise, grocery, produce, and meat.
20 Note that while 
the incumbent supermarkets compete with the entrant discount store on certain items 
(general merchandise and grocery), the discount store does not offer perishable products 
such as fresh produce and meat. Before- and after-entry data for both competing and non-
overlapping products, as well as location of the new entrant provide us with a unique 
opportunity to directly test our main finding in the paper (i.e. hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b 
listed above). However, we should point out a major limitation in the data in that we do 
not observe any sales information from Wal-Mart.  
                                                 
18 All of Dominick’s data is publicly available at the University of Chicago Marketing group. 
19 These data are available at aggregate store level, i.e., we do not observe household level transactions. 
20 Grocery department includes packaged items such as detergents and paper towels.   19
For empirical estimation we use a semi-log specification (e.g. Blattberg and 
Neslin 1990) where daily sales in each department are regressed against an indicator 
variable representing the entry date of Wal-Mart. The regression model also includes a 
share weighted Divisia price index constructed from 29 product categories (see 
Montgomery and Rossi 1999), and indicator variables for holiday and weekends: 
) ) ln( exp( 4 3 2 1 Weekend Hol PI WM S t dt β β β β α + + + + =  
where Sdt is the sales in department d on day t. Parameter estimates from the model above 
are presented in Table 5. The first two rows are sales from departments (general 
merchandise (GM) and grocery) that these stores compete with the entrant discount store, 
and the subsequent rows show sales from food products that are unique at the 
supermarkets. The left panel in the tables shows the estimates for Store #28, and the right 
panel presents the results for Store #119 (corresponding to Stores A & B respectively in 
our theoretical model). 
Most of the price index coefficients are found to be insignificant, and we find the 
sales to be significantly higher during holidays and weekends. Looking at the coefficients 
of focal interest, i.e., those representing competitor entry (Wal-Mart), we find strong 
evidence for the main finding in the paper. In particular, we find that the sales for the two 
departments (GM and Grocery) that incumbents compete with the new entrant are 
significantly lower at both stores (in Table 6 we show the percentage change in sales at 
the two stores due to competitor entry). At the same time we find strong effects for the 
externalities generated by Wal-Mart for the store located close to it (Store #28) with sales 
for several of the food products increasing significantly after competitor entry. On the 
other hand, for Store #119 we find the sales to fall not only in the products they compete 
with Wal-Mart in, but also for the food products. Note that the entrant in this case locates 
2.2 miles from this store and next to a competitor grocery store. These results are 
consistent with our theoretical predictions in hypothesis 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b.  
The last two rows in Tables 5 & 6 show the change in store traffic and total store 
sales for the two incumbents due to competitor entry. We find similar results at the store 
level with Store B showing significant loss in store traffic (11%) and overall sales (16%). 
In contrast, the total store sales go down by only 4% for the store where the entrant is 
located in the same shopping plaza, and this store in fact sees a marginal increase in store   20
traffic. In general, the tradeoff between the positive demand externality versus the losses 
due to competitor entry depends on the degree of overlap across the stores. For instance, 
if the entrant is a store like Home Depot or Barnes & Noble with little overlap with the 
incumbent grocery store, the positive externality could significantly outweigh any 
negative effects. On the other hand, if the entrant is a store like a supercenter (a discount 
store combined with a full supermarket), the store closer to the competitor (Store A in our 
example) is likely to be worse off. Given the prominence of this format, our results 
suggest that incumbent grocery stores should differentiate themselves by providing 
unique offerings such as ethnic and organic foods and an emphasis on home meal 
replacements, deli, and so forth that are not found at supercenters. 
4. Conclusion and Future Research 
In this paper we investigate the impact of entry by a national discount store on local retail 
competition. We develop a model that analyzes the competition between two multi-
product stores that face entry by a differentiated competitor. Pricing strategies followed 
by the incumbents for the two products and the impact of competitor entry on the 
incumbent profitability is analyzed. Our results show that in the post entry equilibrium, 
the prices for the products not offered by the discounter are higher than the pre entry 
prices. More interestingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom we find that the store that 
is closer to the new entrant is better off compared to the incumbent located further away. 
We also find empirical evidence for our main findings. 
These results have managerial implications for traditional multi-product retailers. 
The first is that these retailers should recognize that if entry by a large national discounter 
is inevitable, then it might be better to have it nearby rather than next to a competing 
retailer. Generally, retailers do not wish to have efficient competitors close by, but if 
assortments are somewhat differentiated, then the discounter acts as a filter for the nearby 
retailer (A in our model) by screening out the highly price sensitive customers. As a 
result, this retailer can target its marketing efforts toward the more profitable, less price 
sensitive customers. 
Our results and analysis come with several caveats. First, in our model setup, the 
discount store is not a strategic player. We focus our analysis on the pricing strategies of   21
the two traditional retailers and do not model the discounter as a strategic actor. It would 
be interesting in future research to change the structure of the game to incorporate the 
pricing strategies of the discount store. This would lead to a richer set of conclusions 
regarding pricing strategies for the traditional retailers as well as for the discounter. 
Similarly, we treat the location and product choice of the players as exogenous. Given the 
differences in product purchase frequency, it will be interesting to consider a model 
where store location as well as product choice by the players are endogenous. For 
instance, it may provide some insights into breadth and depth of product assortment 
observed by different retail formats.  
Finally, our results also lend several testable hypotheses for empirical work that 
we were unable to test due to data limitations. For example, we predict that poor 
consumers shift their purchases to the discount store, which can be directly tested with 
individual panel data where one observes the demographic information (including 
income) for the panelists. Similarly, our theory predicts the relative price differences 
across the two stores. However, as discussed above, both the incumbent stores in our data 
belong to the same chain that does not vary its price across stores falling in the same 
price zone. We leave the tests to these claims for future research.     
Appendix 
This appendix contains proofs of Lemmas 1-4 and Propositions 1, 2, & 3. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1  
Suppose by contradiction that all poor consumers go to A, in equilibrium. Then  B A p p 1 1 <  
and  B A p p 2 2 <  with  , 1,2 kA pL k ≤= . Then the portion of (H)igh income consumers 
shopping at A is 
  )] ( ) ( 1 [ 2 1 2 1 2
1
A A B B t H p p p p x + − + + = , 
which is larger than  2
1  by virtue of the uniformly low prices at A. Therefore, profits 
accruing to A are  
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If retailer A marginally increases its price for product k, then its net benefit is given by    22
() () , 1 ) 2 ( ) 1 ( 2
3
2 1 2 H A A t H
kA
A x K p p x
p
− − > − + + − + =
∂
∂ − α α α
π α  
if  L pkA <  and by 
() ( ), ) 2 ( 2
1
2 1 2 − > − + + = ∆
−
H A A t H A p x K p p x
kA α α π
α  
if  L pkA = , where inequalities are a result of Assumption 1. In either case, the net benefit 
from this deviation can be shown to be positive, since  2
1 > H x .    Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2  
By contradiction, suppose in equilibrium retailer A does not sell either product to poor 
consumers. By Lemma 1, retailer B has a price above L, say  L p B > 1 ˆ . Profits to each 
retailer are 
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which are subject to the first order conditions for profit maximization with respect to  A p1  
and  B p1 . These conditions imply that  , 2 ˆ ˆ 2 1 t K p p j j + = +  for  B A j , = , and that  2
1 = H x . 
Consider a deviation by retailer A that involves serving poor consumers. Set  L p A = 1
~  and 
L t K p A − + = 2 ~
2 . This is profitable since profit from rich consumers remains the same, 
but now A earns  0 ) )( 1 ( > − − k L α  from low incomes types.      Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1  
By Lemmas 1 and 2 the only possible equilibria has low income consumers shopping at 
both retailers. Hence, we can restrict attention to outcomes yielding the following profits: 
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where we assume without loss of generality,  L p p B A ≤ 2 1 , . Solving  A
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. (A.4) 
There is no solution such that (A.1)-(A.4) are satisfied with equality. However, under 
Assumption 2, (A.1) and (A.2) are satisfied with  t K p p p p B B A A + = + = + 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 2 1 2 1 . Then 
(A.3) and (A.4) hold with strict inequality, suggesting the corner solution in which 
L p p B A = = 2 1 ˆ ˆ . Solving for  A p2 ˆ  and  B p1 ˆ  gives the prices as stated in the proposition. 
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply  2, 1 ˆˆ AB Lpp Hs < <− . This solution constitutes an 
equilibrium, so long as there is no profitable deviation. We can rule local deviations by 
virtue of the maximization. However, we must check whether it is profitable for one 
retailer, say A, to undercut B with the price  ε ε − = − = L p p A A 2 2 ˆ , for small  0 > ε . The 
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because all poor consumers buy both products from A. This payoff is clearly decreasing 
in ε , so we let  0 ↓ ε  and derive the net benefit from this deviation: 
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) 1 , 0 ( ∈ BE α  so that  ) ( 0 BE f K L α = − < . Hence, there is no profitable deviation 
(i.e. 0 < δ ) for any  ) 1 , ( BE α α ∈ .         Q . E . D .  
 
Proof of Lemma 3   24
(i) Since Big Basket rich consumers visit store C to buy product 3, the assumption that 
store C has the lowest price for product 2 implies that these consumers will buy it there 
while buying product 3. Therefore, they will visit exactly one more store (either A or B) 
for product 1. (ii) Since no consumer will visit a number of stores greater than the 
number of products demanded, it is sufficient to show that Small Basket rich consumers 
will not visit two stores. Define a two-store shopping plan as a pair  ) , ( 2 1 s s , 
} , , { C B A si ∈ ,  2 1 s s ≠ , which prescribes the consumer to buy product i from store  i s . 
Since C does not offer product 1, we have four possible two-store shopping plans: (A,B), 
(B,A), (A,C) or (B,C). First, we show that shopping plans (A,B) and (B,A) cannot be an 
equilibrium shopping plan for Small Basket rich consumers because they are dominated 
by either (A,C) or (B,C). Denote  ) , ( 2 1 s s cx  as the cost incurred by a consumer located at x 
carrying out the shopping plan inclusive of price. Since  K p p B A > 1 1 , , then for any x, 
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Next, we exclude (A,C). Suppose this plan were part of an equilibrium. Then we must 
have  A C p s p 2 2 < + . But then no one will buy product 2 at A. Hence, there is a profitable 
deviation for A to lower its price to  s K s p p C A + = + = 2 2  and receive positive profits. It 
remains to show that (B,C) cannot arise in equilibrium. Suppose prices  A A p p 2 1 ,  , 
B B p p 2 1 ,  yielded (B,C) as the optimal shopping plan for some Small Basket rich 
consumers. We show that such pricing behavior yields a contradiction. The hypothesis 
implies that  A B p p 1 1 < . And since  A C p p 2 2 < , no poor consumers will patronize A. A 
Small Basket rich consumer located at x will buy the bundle from A if it is cheaper then 
buying the bundle from B 
  s t x p p s xt p p B B A A + − + + < + + + ) 1 ( 2 1 2 1  
and cheaper than (B,C) 
  s t p p s xt p p C B A A 2 2 1 2 1 + + + < + + + . 
Let  2 x  and  A x2  be defined, respectively, as satisfying the above two conditions with 
equality, then    25
[] t p p p p x A A B B t + + − + = ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 2
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1
2 .  
Hence, Small Basket rich consumers with  2 x x <  prefer the bundle at A to the bundle at B 
and with  A x x 2 <  prefer the bundle at A to (B,C). Similarly, Small Basket rich consumers 
at x prefer the bundle at B over (B,C) if  s t p p s t x p p C B B B 2 ) 1 ( 2 1 2 1 + + + < + − + + , 
or equivalently, if  [ ] s p p x x C B t B − − = > 2 2
1
2 . We observe that  2 / ) ( 2 2 2 B A x x x + = , 
which implies that  2 x  lies between  A x2  and  B x2 . Thus, there are two possibilities to 
consider. First,  A B x x x 2 2 2 < <  implies that all Small Basket rich consumers prefer buying 
the bundle at either A or at B to shopping around (i.e. to (B,C)), which contradicts the 
hypothesis that (B,C) is optimal for some Small Basket consumers. Hence, 
B A x x x 2 2 2 < < . Big Basket rich consumers located a x will shop at A (for product 1) and 
C (for products 2 and 3) if it is cheaper than shopping at B (for product 1) if 
  t x p p B A ) 1 ( 1 1 − + < , 
or equivalently if  t t p p x x A B / ) ( 1 1 1 + − = < . Thus profits to each store can be written as 
  1 1 2 2 1 ) ( ) 2 )( 1 ( x K p x K p p A A A A A − + − + − = αβ β α π , and 
[ ] ). ( ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 2 )( 1 ( 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 K p x x x x K p p B A B B B B B − − − + − + − + − − + − = β α αβ α β α π
 
Prices must be mutually optimal for the two firms. Therefore, interior optima must satisfy 
the first order conditions for profit maximization, which imply the following prices: 
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This leads to  t s L K x x A B / ) 2 ( 2 2 − − = − , which is less than 0 since  K L > . Hence, 
A B x x 2 2 < ,  again  a  contradiction.        Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4 
Suppose product 1 is cheaper at A:  B A p p 1 1 < . Then all Big Basket consumers will shop at 
retailer C for good 3. While there, these consumers also buy product 2 at C. Furthermore, 
all Big Basket consumers buy product 1 from A: poor Big Basket consumers since it has 
the lowest price; rich consumers since they, already at retailer C, do not benefit from 
incurring costs traveling to B. Now consider Small Basket consumers. Poor Small Basket 
consumers shop at A and C for products 1 and 2, respectively. Rich Small Basket 
consumers shop either at A or at B and buy both products at one of these stores. (Recall 
that rich consumers visit no more than one store for two products, by Lemma 1.) A rich 
Small Basket consumer located at x will shop at A if 
t
p p p p
x x
A A B B
S 2
) ( ) ( 2 1 2 1 + − +
≡ < . 
(As noted previously, these consumers make their retailer choice based solely on the 
price of the bundle of the items.) The consumer behavior described above generates the 
following profit functions for each retailer: 
S A A A A A x K p p K p K p ) 2 )( 1 ( ) ( ) )( 1 ( 2 1 1 1 − + − + − + − − = β α αβ α π  
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We now show that there exists a profitable deviation whenever  B A p p 1 1 < . First suppose 
K p A > 1 . Then B can always lower its price on product 1 and raise its price on product 2 
so that  B A p p 2 2 +  does not change, but  A A p p K 1 2 < < . In such a deviation, retailer B 
retains the same rich Small Basket consumers and steals all poor consumers buying 
product 2. Hence, this is a profitable deviation for B. Next, suppose  B A p K p 1 1 < = . Then 
clearly A can raise its price on product 1 slightly and lower its price on product 2 while 
preserving the sum  A A p p 2 1 + . This is profitable since it retains the same customers, but 
extracts positive revenues from its poor customers. Hence, it is not possible to have an   27
equilibrium with  B A p p 1 1 < . Finally, we consider the case when  B A p p 1 1 =  and show 
there always exists a profitable deviation. Note that this implies the following profits for 
the two retailers: 
S A A B A A A x K p p x K p K p ) 2 )( 1 ( ) ( ) (
2
) 1 (
2 1 1 1 − + − + − + −
−
= β α αβ
α
π  
) 1 )( 2 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( ( ) (
2
) 1 (
2 1 1 1 S B B B B B B x K p p x K p K p − − + − + − − + −
−
= β α αβ
α
π , 
where ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ i x  is the portion of consumers with basket size  S B i , =  shopping at A. If 
K p p B A = = 1 1 , then either retailer, say A, can earn more profits by slightly raising its 
price on product 1 since it would loose no revenue from the poor segment and improve 
revenues from the rich segment. If  K p p B A > = 1 1  then either retailer, say A, can be 
profitable by lowering  A p1  by a small amount (some  0 > ε , sufficiently small) while 
raising  A p2  so that  A A p p 2 1 +  remains constant since it experiences a discrete gain in 
poor consumers and no loss from the  rich  consumers.     Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
(i) The first order conditions of (1) with respect to  ) , ( 2 1 A A p p  and (2) with respect to 
) , ( 2 1 B B p p  imply interior maxima, as presented in part (i). To validate that these prices 
are, in fact, an equilibrium, we verify that that the outcome is 
(a) consistent with our assumptions on consumer behavior 
(b) not subject to profitable deviations by either retailer, 
for all α  and β  sufficiently large.  
 
(a) The conditions  L p B ≤
*




1 A B p p <  were assumed in our formulation of profit 
functions (1) and (2). The first is implied by Assumption 1 if  4 / 1
1
β α + > . The second holds 
if and only if  β α + > 1




AE , both conditions hold for  AE α α > . 
Finally, Assumption 3 ensures positive demand for product 2 at retailer A from Small 
basket rich consumers since  s K p A + ≤
*








1 B B p p  are 
consistent with our assumptions on consumer behavior. (b) To check for profitable   28
deviations, first note that the profits at these prices can be expressed as in (4) and (5). 
Local deviations cannot be profitable by the maximization conditions on (1) and (2). We 




A B p p > . In 
this case, retailer B looses all poor consumers as well as all rich Big Basket consumers 
( 1 > B x ). This leaves B with profits  
 ) ~ 1 )( 2 ~ ~ )( 1 ( ~
2 1 S B B B x K p p − − + − = β α π , 




1 2 1 ) 2 ( ) ( ) ~ ~ ( ~ < + + − + = t t p p p p x A A B B S . This deviation is not profitable, 
since 
 
, ) 1 )( 2 )( 1 (







B S B B
B p p





< − − + − =
+ − =
 




1 B B p p . 
Now suppose retailer A deviates by undercutting B for product 1. That is, consider the 




B A p p , for small  0 > ε . Any such deviation is most 
profitable if A sets  B p2
~  in order to maintain the bundled price  K t p p A A 2 ~ ~
2 1 + = + . This 
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Using the above and comparing with the profits in (4), we can express the direct gain 
from deviation: 
  t A A αβ
β α β β α
π π
9
5 ) 2 ( 5 ) 5 5 ( ~
2 2 2
* − − + − +
= − .     (A.8) 
For any  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ β , (A.8) is positive for  ) (β α α AE > . (ii) follows from direct substitution 
of  equilibrium  prices  into  (3).         Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Consider the difference in retailer’s equilibrium profits, as expressed in (4) and (5): 




1 2 ) 1 (
2
* * − + −
= − .   29
This difference is positive for 
β β α




1 . These conditions, however, are implied by 
the assumed conditions in Proposition 2.             Q.E.D. 
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